Less hot air in the greenhouse, please! by Mason, E.G.
NZ JOURNAL OF FORESTRY, AUGUST 20062
editorial
Foresters have plenty to offer to a world grappling with greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and global warming.  Afforestation of pasture increases carbon 
stored in biomass on the landscape.  In addition, because 
trees store carbon as they capture energy and then release the 
same carbon into the atmosphere when their wood is burned, 
wood is a GHG neutral fuel.  Or is it?  Wood combustion 
can release nitrous oxide which is 296 times more potent per 
molecule (assuming a 100 year global warming time horizon, 
according to the 3rd Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change assessment report) as a greenhouse gas than carbon 
dioxide.  Bio-energy is not a simple matter.
It is therefore timely to devote this issue of the Journal 
to bio-energy, and I am very grateful to Associate Professor 
Shusheng Pang who first suggested the theme and then 
acted as guest associate editor for this issue, which will 
particularly appeal to forest engineers.  Using forest residues 
as bio-energy will help to slow the greenhouse effect.
But wait, there’s more that foresters can do to reduce 
global warming.
The NZ Institute of Forestry proposes to facilitate a 
domestic enterprise-to-enterprise “gray” market for “carbon 
credits” that would help New Zealand meet our government-
to-government commitments under the Kyoto agreement 
and also help to slow global warming.  Enterprises that 
burn fossil fuels or emit prodigious amounts of methane 
would be able to purchase credits from GHG sequesterers, 
such as forest owners.  Emitters could then claim to be 
GHG neutral which will be a tangible asset as consumers 
increasingly discriminate against emitters.  Our economic 
transformation will be swift when consumers finally begin 
to boycott GHG emitters, and those with gray credits will be 
less vulnerable.  Forest owners will be partially rewarded for 
an environmental service that they have hitherto provided 
for free.
What can the Institute do?  It seems unwise for the 
NZIF to actively engage in credit transactions, because we 
are not a business and we shouldn’t expose the Institute to 
the risks associated with trading on a large scale. We can 
set some of the ground rules and act as an advocate for 
the environment, however.  Piers Maclaren has pointed 
out that a GHG market is unusual because both sellers 
and purchasers have an interest in overestimating credits. 
Consequently, our expertise will be needed simply to ensure 
the integrity of the process.
A set of standards for estimating GHG sequestration 
by New Zealand’s forests, similar to the NZIF forest 
valuation standards, is urgently needed.  Superficially 
it seems obvious that stand carbon content can be 
estimated by equations that Dr John Moore (formerly of 
Scion Ltd.) recently developed, and that all we need are 
accurate mensurational estimates of stems to drive these 
equations.  However, the following questions must first be 
resolved by an independent party.  Precisely how should 
these mensurational estimates be derived? How should 
allometric relations be scaled for different sites? Which 
growth and yield models should be used for estimating 
future sequestration? Which afforestation projects should 
be eligible for the scheme? How much sequestered carbon 
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should be allocated as credits when forests are destined 
to be clearfelled? What requirements should there be for 
replanting, or for refunding of credits at time of harvest? 
We alone can set these standards well, and we should begin 
this task immediately.
Secondly, fair ground rules for credit transactions are 
urgently required.  We need to figure out what these rules 
should be.  It is logical for emitters to pay sequesterers, and 
this should be our guiding principle.  It has been suggested, 
however, that emitters who reduced their emissions might 
also be entitled to sell credits.  This is troubling because 
it is inconsistent with the principle of emitters paying 
sequesterers, and would bring the scheme into disrepute. 
Consider, for example, a power generator that creates a 
wind farm and shuts down one of its two coal-fired plants, 
thereby reducing its GHG emissions by 50%.  Suppose it 
could earn credits for its 50% reduction.  Then it could use 
its new credits to offset its remaining 50% GHG emissions 
and claim to be GHG neutral!  It would clearly not be GHG 
neutral, because it would have reduced its net emissions 
by 50% not 100%.  According to the ground rules that 
we should set, the power generator in question should be 
advantaged 50% not 100%.  They would need to buy credits 
from sequesterers in order to be GHG neutral, but by virtue 
of their emission reductions they would need to buy 50% 
fewer such credits.
We also need to distinguish between net carbon 
emissions and greenhouse effects.  For instance, while it’s 
true that almost half our national GHG emissions come 
from livestock as methane (37.2 Mt CO2-equivalents in 
2003), farms are, apart from (relatively minor) fossil energy 
inputs in the use of machinery etc., in themselves carbon 
neutral.  The action of the farms on the environment is not 
to release extra carbon into the atmosphere; pastures fix 
atmospheric carbon dioxide and then livestock release the 
carbon as methane.  Unfortunately for farmers, methane 
is approximately 23 times worse as a greenhouse gas than 
carbon dioxide (assuming a 100 year global warming time 
horizon).  While livestock farming could be said to be carbon 
neutral, potential effects on global warming clearly are not 
neutral, and the Kyoto treaty recognises this difference. 
We should expect farmers to either purchase credits from 
foresters or plant more woodlots if they wish to claim 
neutrality with respect to global warming, even though they 
could be said to be already carbon neutral.  We need to set up 
a trade in “green house gas equivalents” rather than carbon 
per se.  We should call them “greenhouse gas credits”.
Lastly, the grapevine says that our government is 
about to initiate incentives for tree planting as part of 
its greenhouse policy.  It will be interesting to see what 
emerges; whether the incentives simply raise land prices, 
for instance, and also whether foreign governments seek to 
impose tariffs on our wood exports in response to a perceived 
subsidisation of wood production.  Clearly greenhouse 
policy has many pitfalls for governments.  The NZIF’s 
contribution to solving the greenhouse problem is much 
easier, so let’s get on with it!
Euan Mason
